Marketing communication plays a major role in influencing consumer purchases in new product categories. An important question about this communication relates to the roles it plays over the life cycle of the new product category. One effect of marketing communication is to reduce uncertainty about product quality. Since this affects consumers choice decisions only through the updation of consumers' perceptions about product quality, we term this as the indirect effect. In contrast, we term all marketing communication that directly affects consumers' preferences as the direct effect. The indirect effect is likely to be larger for uninformed consumers than for consumers who are better informed. We expect that consumers are not well informed about product quality in the early stages of the product life cycle but they become better informed over time. Thus, we expect the indirect effect to play an important role in the early stages, but not in later stages. On the other hand, we do not expect the direct effect to change much over time. Therefore, we expect that there are temporal differences in the role of marketing communication in different stages of the life cycle of a product.
Introduction
Marketing communication plays a major role in consumer adoption of new product categories. Many of these new categories involve repeated purchases i.e., repeated decision-making on part of the consumer. In addition, some of these categories involve experience goods. In these cases, most of the product characteristics are intangibles about which consumers are not well informed before adoption and use. In addition to marketing communication, product experience also plays a significant role in influencing consumer preferences and behavior in such categories. There is little research that documents the exact role(s) of marketing communication in the evolution of preferences of consumers in categories that are new to these consumers. In this research, we use a modeling approach that allows us to distinguish and examine the evolution of the two major effects of marketing communication since the inception of the category. The two effects that we consider are based on existing theories of the role of marketing communication.
Specifically, we distinguish between the indirect and direct effects of marketing communication. In our definition, the indirect effect refers to marketing communication that allows consumers to update their prior beliefs and reduce uncertainty about the true quality of the new product via a Bayesian learning process. In contrast, the direct effect consists of all effects that are not indirect (including effects such as reminder and affect changes) and is captured as a shift in consumer utility.
We conduct our empirical analysis on data from a category of ethical drugs. In the pharmaceutical industry, direct marketing communication with physicians is usually referred to as detailing. Detailing comprises of promotional visits made to physicians by pharmaceutical representatives. The main sources of information considered by physicians to inform their current diagnoses and prescription decisions are detailing, meetings and conferences, and feedback from past prescriptions. Additional sources of information include word of mouth and journal advertising. Our main focus is the effect of detailing in influencing the evolution of physician preferences and consequent prescriptions. As mentioned earlier, our aim is to distinguish between the two existing postulated effects of such detailing -indirect and direct -over time for a new product category.
Note that our definition of indirect and direct effects loosely maps to the "informative" (indirect) and the "persuasive" (direct) 1 effects of marketing communication documented via structural approaches in the economics and marketing literature. 2 Studies that have modeled one or both of these effects include Erdem and Keane (1996) , Anand and Shachar (2001) , Currie and Park (2002) , Ackerberg (2003) and Byzalov and Shachar (2003) . Table 1 contains a richer description of these studies. As can be seen from the table, the findings on the presence of these effects are mixed. For example, some studies have found evidence for a predominantly indirect effect (Erdem and Keane 1996 , Ackerberg 2002 , Currie and Park 2002 . Anand and Shachar (2001) , in contrast, find evidence for both effects (in a mature product category). Byzalov and Shachar (2003) find that risk aversion may explain the direct effect found in studies that assume risk neutrality.
Thus, based on extant research, it can be argued that there is evidence for both indirect and direct effects of marketing communication. We allow for both effects in our work and further postulate that the role of detailing is different in the introduction stage of a drug versus the later stages. At the time of introduction of a drug, a physician's experience is limited and it is likely that she is uncertain and not well informed about its efficacy (an intangible characteristic). Hence, detailing is postulated to have a primarily indirect effect in the introductory phase of the life cycle of the drug. In other words, it helps the physician in identifying the "true" efficacy of the drug and reducing the uncertainty around this true efficacy. Over time, as the physician learns from patient feedback and her experience develops, the uncertainty about a drug's efficacy is substantially reduced and the effects of detailing are likely to be more direct and to dominate the indirect effect.
As mentioned earlier, the dataset for our empirical analysis is from a category of ethical drugs. This category consists of second-generation antihistamines, which are drugs prescribed for allergies. Our dataset consists of aggregate data on second-generation antihistamines for the total United States market. A unique feature of this dataset is that we observe marketing activities and physician prescription behavior from the time of introduction of the category. We also observe it for a relatively long period of time post introduction.
These features of the data allow us to investigate the effects of marketing communication in the introductory as well as subsequent stages of the life-cycles of the brands in the category. 3 Ethical drugs are particularly suitable to study the role of marketing communication on evolution of preferences, as there is substantial uncertainty in how patients respond to treatments. That is, physicians (who are the decision makers for the prescription decision) are not perfectly informed about the efficacy (where the effectiveness of the drug is to be weighed against the potential side effect of the drug) of a new drug prior to its use. In addition, the majority of marketing communication dollars in this industry is targeted at the physician (Wittink 2002) . We develop a brand-level discrete-choice model of demand that explicitly allows for category expansion. In this model, we assume that the indirect effect of detailing affects the physician's preference for a given drug through a Bayesian learning process. On the other hand, the direct role of detailing takes the form of linear goodwill stock variables in the utility function of the physician (cf. Nerlove and Arrow 1982) .
Thus, we focus our analysis on the indirect and direct effects of detailing while controlling for other promotional activities. In contrast to most other research, we find evidence for both the indirect and direct effect of detailing on physicians' prescription behavior. In addition, we find that detailing has primarily indirect effects in the introductory phase (typically 6-14 months post introduction) but that the direct effects dominate later on. The finding that the direct effects are significant may explain why firms continue to detail long after a drug is introduced. We also find that, on average, physicians are most responsive to detailing relative to other promotional activities.
The key contributions of this paper are the following. First, it empirically distinguishes between two different effects of marketing communication -the direct effect and the indirect effect, and finds evidence for both. Second, it documents the temporal aspect of these two effects of detailing, i.e., it finds that the indirect effect dominates in the introductory phase of the product life cycle and the direct effect dominates later. Third, it provides empirical estimates for the length of time for which the indirect effect dominates.
Finally, it fills the gap between research that studies new product categories without explicitly accounting for the behavioral process by which preferences evolve (e.g., Heilman et al. 2000) and research that accounts for this behavioral process (typically as a learning process) but does not study products or product categories that are new to the consumer (e.g., Erdem and Keane 1996, Anand and Shachar 2001) .
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide some background on the prescription drug market. Section 3 describes the data and the antihistamines category. In section 4, we discuss the model. Section 5 has the empirical specification, our estimation methodology and identification arguments. Section 6 presents the results of our empirical analysis. We conclude and present directions for future research in Section 7.
The Prescription Drug Market
The prescription decision for ethical drugs involves multiple agents. While the end consumer is the patient, the decision-maker is usually the physician and there are often intermediaries like insurance firms, HMOs or government agencies, who pay in part for the prescription drugs. Thus, unlike most consumer goods categories, prescription drugs are not available to the end consumer for purchase unless a physician has prescribed the drug for a particular patient. Though it is possible that the patient may have some influence on this choice, the primary decision maker is the physician. Pharmaceutical firms consequently focus their primary marketing efforts on physicians. For instance, in a study of 392 branded drugs, Wittink 2002 (see also Neslin 2001) reports that, in 2000, approximately 8.5 billion dollars were spent on promotions directed at physicians while about 2.5 billion dollars were spent on direct to consumer advertising.
The primary form of promotion directed towards the physicians is detailing. This activity refers to the calls made by representatives of the pharmaceutical firms (referred to as detailers) on physicians. In these calls, detailers talk to the physician about specific conditions, drug characteristics, results of clinical trials, potential side effects etc. During these calls, they typically use brochures and other printed material as information aids. At the end of the call, they may also leave behind other promotional material such as office items and drug samples. Other marketing activities that pharmaceutical firms direct towards physicians include meetings and seminars, where experts for particular diseases or conditions are invited for talks, and advertising in medical journals. Relative to detailing, expenditure on these activities is relatively small (Wittink 2002) . For example, in our dataset for antihistamines, the total expenditure on these other marketing activities directed at physicians is only 13% of that on detailing.
The other main form of promotional expenditure in the pharmaceutical industry in general, and the antihistamines category in particular, is that on direct to consumer (henceforth referred to as DTC)
advertising. This, as the name suggests, is primarily directed towards patients. There were severe restrictions on direct to consumer advertising in the past, but in 1997 the Food and Drug Administration substantially relaxed the regulations on DTC advertising. This has led to a phenomenal growth in the expenditure on this activity (see Wittink 2002 , Neslin 2001 , Rosenthal et al. 2002 . For instance, in our dataset, the expenditure on DTC advertising as a proportion of that on detailing increased from 39% in the period 1993-1996 to 77% in 1997-2001 . Prior research (Wosinska 2002 , Rosenthal et al. 2002 , Xie 2003 has found that DTC advertising primarily drives category growth by getting the patient to speak to their doctor about their health condition, but does not affect the physician decision.
The price of drugs also plays a role, either directly or through intermediaries, in affecting the choice of the prescribed drug. In the case of patients covered by insurance, there are often differential co-payments for more expensive and less expensive drugs. For instance, insurance plans usually have a differential copayment amount for branded and generic drugs (cf. Artunian 2002) . In addition, HMOs often have preferred drugs on their formulary that they require physicians to prescribe unless an off-formulary drug is absolutely essential. Whether a drug is on the formulary or not is usually based on lower negotiated prices. Uninsured patients pay for their own prescription drugs and thus are directly affected by the price of the drug. 4 Other evidence on the effects of marketing mix activities on pharmaceutical demand is provided by a large number of studies in the marketing, economics and medical literatures. Some early studies in marketing literature (e.g., Parsons and Vanden Abeele 1981, Lilien et al. 1981 ) used aggregate sales-territory level data to investigate the effects of sales force activity on sales. Leffler (1981) and Hurwitz and Caves (1988) use data from multiple categories of ethical drugs to investigate informative and persuasive roles of promotional activity. Currie and Park (2002) investigate the effect of drug advertising on the prescription decision in a pharmaceutical category. Rizzo (1999) also uses multi-category data to document the effect of advertising on price elasticities in pharmaceutical markets. Wosinska (2002) estimates the impact of detailing and DTC advertising in the anti-cholesterol category. Finally, some recent studies have investigated various aspects of pharmaceutical demand using panel data (Kamakura and Kossar 1998 , Gönül et al. 2001 , Manchanda and Chintagunta 2000 , Manchanda et al. 2003 These studies show that detailing has an effect on physicians' prescription behavior. However, as mentioned earlier, all these studies are agnostic about the mechanism by which marketing mix activities affect physician prescription behavior.
Data
The data used in this study is for the antihistamines market in the United States and was obtained from Verispan Inc., a firm that collects data on prescriptions written by physicians and marketing activities of pharmaceutical firms. Our data contains monthly observations from April 1993 to December 2001 for the entire United States antihistamines market. We use the data for the three main second-generation antihistamine brands -Claritin (introduced April 1993), Zyrtec (introduced January 1996) and Allegra (introduced August 1996) -in our study. Clarinex, which is the fourth antihistamine in the category was introduced only in January 2002 and hence is not included in our analysis. There are thus 242 brand-month combinations for these brands that we use in our study.
As mentioned earlier, a unique feature of this dataset is that we observe the category from its inception. Hence the data do not suffer from the "initial conditions" problem that is common in models of the kind we shall use. We also observe the data for a fairly long period of time and at frequent (monthly) intervals. For each brand, we have information on the number of new prescriptions (no refills) -NRXswritten in that month, the average retail price 5 for a prescription and expenditure on detailing, DTC advertising and on other marketing activities such as meetings and events (henceforth OME). The NRX and retail price data are collected by Verispan through a pharmacy retail audit while the data on promotional expenditures are collected directly from the respective pharmaceutical firms for each drug. Table 2 contains descriptive statistics for the data. From the table, it is clear that detailing is the primary form of promotional activity directed at physicians -expenditure on detailing is about six times larger than that on other marketing activities directed at physicians. The expenditure on direct to consumer advertising is in the same range as that on detailing. Claritin is the largest brand in the category. It is also the highest priced brand and has the highest mean DTC advertising expenditure. However, it is Allegra that has the highest mean detailing and other marketing expenditures. Table 2 also shows the seasonal effect that exists in this category -there are substantial differences between the number of prescriptions written in the months that constitute the allergy season and in the other months.
Model
In this section, we discuss our model. We begin by motivating our model structure as a function of the nature of the research problem, industry practice and our assumptions. We then discuss the model specification.
Prescription Decision
As described earlier, the prescription decision is a complex multi-agent process, involving the physician, the patient and possibly intermediaries like insurance firms and HMOs. However, the final decision is the physician's since the drug is dispensed only on the basis of the physician's prescription. Hence, we abstract away from this multi-agent process and make the assumption that there is a single decision making unit, which we shall henceforth refer to as the physician.
We assume that the physician values the health of the patient and her preferences maps into a utility function over the space of treatment options. This may be because of a sense of professional integrity and/or a desire to avoid malpractice suits in the future and to maintain her reputation. When the physician needs to make a decision on treatment for a patient, she is assumed to choose the option that gives her the highest utility. Based on the medical literature (VHA 1999) and our discussion with physicians, the drugs in this category are seen as substitutes and the use of multiple drugs to treat allergies is extremely rare. We therefore assume that the physician makes a discrete choice amongst available options, i.e., she chooses only one of the alternatives for a particular patient. Further, we assume that drugs are bundles of characteristics and that the physicians have utility over those bundles of characteristics. These characteristics are observed by the physician, but some of these may be observed with uncertainty. Given that the physician imperfectly observes one or more of these characteristics before she makes a decision, she maximizes the expected utility of the alternatives at the decision stage.
In our case, we assume that the physician has an imperfect knowledge about the mean efficacy of the drug. The underlying dimensions that comprise the efficacy of a drug are, among others, how well it treats the condition for which it is prescribed, the severity of the side effects that patients' experience, the time it takes to treat the condition, and the post-treatment state of health of the patient. Thus, she has a belief about the mean efficacy but this is in the form of a distribution. She updates this belief as she learns about the drug through prescription experience and through information received from pharmaceutical firms.
Learning Process
Physicians are assumed to start with an initial prior belief about the mean efficacy of the drug when they first become aware of it. It is important to note that since they are uncertain about the mean efficacy of the drug, this initial prior belief is represented by a distribution. At each time period, physicians use three sources of information to update their prior beliefs about the mean efficacy of each drug in a Bayesian fashion. This information set consists of (i) the feedback received from patients who were prescribed the drug in the last period; 6 (ii) information given by pharmaceutical firms through detailing; and (iii) other marketing activities directed towards physicians. We shall refer to these as feedback, detailing and OME signals respectively. 7 We now list our assumptions regarding the learning process. First, given that we are not aware of any data source that informs us about the nature of patient feedback (e.g., proportion, frequency, timing), we assume that the number of feedback signals is equal to the number of prescriptions written in the last period. 8 Note that this is a conservative assumption as the mean number of patient trips made annually in this category is less than one (NCHS 2000) . Second, we also assume that the numbers of detailing and OME signals in a time period are equal to the number of dollars spent on detailing and OME in that period. 9 Third, the aggregate nature of our data (where we observe only the total amount spent on detailing or OME by a firm for each time period) imposes the assumption that all physicians receive the same number of detailing and OME signals. 10 However, note that we allow the signal content to differ across physicians. Fourth, the nature of our data also imposes the assumption that all signals (detailing and OME) are received at the beginning of the temporal period of our data. That is, all the information in the details or OME in a particular period is available to the physician at the beginning of the period. Similarly, the feedback signals of the prescriptions written in the last period are also available at the beginning of each period. Finally, at each stage, we assume that the physician updates her beliefs about the efficacy of the drugs in a Bayesian manner, i.e., she has a set of prior beliefs based on the information set up to the previous period and she updates this with the information set of the current period to form a set of posterior beliefs. She then uses this set of posterior beliefs to take decisions in the current period. This set of posterior beliefs forms the set of prior beliefs for the next period.
Heterogeneity
We assume that physicians may be heterogeneous in their responses to various linear characteristics in their utility function (e.g., price). This is likely to arise from the fact that each physician can potentially treat a different set of patients. For instance, the distribution of the price coefficient could represent the distribution of the mean price coefficient for the patients of different physicians. 6 While we do not have (free) samples in our data, the effect of sampling is captured via the past prescriptions. The only assumption we need to make is that feedback from a regular prescription is not systematically different from a sample based prescription. Any residual effect of samples is captured in the econometric error term. 7 Note that physicians could potentially also learn from medical journal advertising that is not in our data.
Specification: Learning about efficacy
In this section we describe the learning process for an individual physician. Let pjt Q denote the physician's belief about the mean efficacy of drug j at time t (where the ~ sign indicates that it is a random variable from the point of view of physician). This is conditional on the information set of the physician upto time t. Let pjt Q denote the mean of this belief (distribution) at time t and let the variance of the belief be At time t=0, the initial belief of the physician about the mean efficacy of drug j is assumed to be normally distributed. Further, for simplicity, we make the assumption that it is the same for all the drugs in the category and for all physicians i.e.,
The i th feedback signal at time t for drug j assumed to be a normally distributed, is given by
The i th detailing signal for drug j at time t is also assumed to be normally distributed since there is variation across individual physician-detailer interactions. The signal is given by
Similarly, the i th OME signal for drug j at time t is given by 2 ,~(0 , )
Thus, we assume that the detailing, OME and feedback signals are all normally distributed around the true mean efficacy. The implicit assumption is these signals are truthful, i.e., they are equal to the true mean efficacy of the drug in expectation. We also assume that these signals are independent -an assumption that could potentially be relaxed if with richer data that had more variation than in our current dataset. The variances in equations (1) ~ (4) are unknown parameters.
At the beginning of time t, the physician's beliefs are formed by updating her belief at time (t-1) with the feedback, OME and detailing signals available at the start of time t. Given that the initial prior distribution (i.e., at time t=0) is normally distributed and all three signals are normally distributed, the selfconjugacy of the normal distribution implies that the posterior belief in any time period would also be normally distributed. Thus, the belief at the beginning of time t is given by
The mean of this posterior belief can be derived as
where 
It is important to note that while the physician knows her belief (i.e., the distribution of efficacy) with certainty at each time period, the econometrician does not observe it. This is because while the physician observes the realizations of the detailing and efficacy signals in the information set, the econometrician does not. 12
Specification: Utility Function and Share Expression
Physician p's utility of prescribing drug j to her patient at time t is assumed to be a quadratic function of the uncertain mean efficacy belief, allowing for a flexible specification with respect to risk. We specify the utility function to be of the form given below
where 12 Early studies that used a Bayesian learning process to model category level diffusion include Stoneman (1981) and Jensen (1982) . More recent studies include Meyer and Sathi (1985) , Roberts and Urban (1988) , Erdem and Keane (1996) , Crawford and Shum (2003) , Coscelli and Shum (2003) , Mookherjee (2002) , Ching (2002) , Anand and Shachar (2001) , Ackerberg (2003) and Byzalov and Shachar (2003) . 
where the expectation is over the efficacy distribution.
Thus,
where pjt Q and 2 jt Q σ are defined in equations (6) and 14 respectively.
Let the utility of the outside good (i.e., treatment options other than second generation antihistamines) be given as
For the purpose of expositional convenience, we define
Note that the presence of the outside good allows for category expansion, i.e., the total sales of second-generation antihistamines are allowed to vary (increase or decrease) over time. The time trend in the utility for the outside good allows for systematic trends in the overall second-generation antihistamines category, other than the ones we have explicitly modeled in our learning process.
We assume that the pjt ε terms are i.i.d. extreme value Type I errors. Thus, we get the standard Logit probability (McFadden 1973 ) that physician p prescribes drug j at time t as
where J is the total number of brands.
The aggregate share is thus obtained by integrating this probability over the physicians i.e., ( )
where ψ is the joint distribution of physician characteristics, which include the mean efficacy terms and the coefficients for observed characteristics. θ is a vector of parameters for this joint distribution ψ , which includes the variance of the prior belief, the variances of the detailing and feedback signals and the heterogeneity variances.
We note here that the set of physician-specific mean efficacy ( pjt Q ) for the J brands is observed by the physician but not by the econometrician. Further, this random variable is serially correlated, as the draw in period t depends on the draw in period (t-1). This is clear if we look at the expression for pjt Q in equation (5). Also, the coefficients p β are observed by the physician but unobserved by the econometrician.
jt X is a vector of observed attributes of the brand. In our empirical analysis of the antihistamines category, we include goodwill stock variables for detailing, DTC advertising (DTC) and meetings and events expenditure (OME) in addition to price and a dummy for the peak allergy season in jt X . The goodwill stocks are of the standard Nerlove-Arrow (1962) form
where jt D is the detailing stock of brand j at time t, jt d is the detailing flow (i.e., detailing expenditure) of brand j at time t, and D θ is the proportion of the goodwill stock of a period that is carried over.
We construct goodwill stocks for DTC advertising and OME in a similar fashion. The reason for using goodwill stock is to account for carryover effects in these variables, which may be potentially important.
Thus, by entering the detailing stock in the linear specification, we allow for its direct effect on prescription behavior. We have already accounted for its indirect role in the learning process. Thus we can distinguish these two effects empirically.
There are two allergy seasons -spring (March to June) and fall (September and October). The seasonal variations are clear from Table 2 , which shows the substantial difference between mean NRXs in the months that constitute the two allergy seasons and in other months. We therefore include a dummy variable for each allergy season in our specification.
Word-of-mouth may play an important role in the physician's learning and prescription process.
However, our data do not capture this phenomenon. The time trend in our specification acts as a reasonable proxy for word-of-mouth as well as for the stock of past prescriptions. 13 jt ξ is an iid unobserved characteristic that is common across physicians but varies by brand and time. It is important to note that it is unobserved by the researcher but observed by the physician. It could include the effect of marketing activities by pharmaceutical firms that we do not observe, for instance, advertising in medical journals.
Identification
In this section, we lay out the identification arguments for the model parameters (for a detailed discussion of identification issues for learning models in general, see Coscelli and Shum 2003;  for specific identification issues when using aggregate data, see Ching 2002) . The identification of the linear parameters ( p β ), given the set of non-linear parameters is straightforward as it requires the assumption of exogeneity of the time of entry of drugs. This is quite reasonable given the institutional feature in this market wherein drugs can enter only after approval from the FDA.
In order to understand how the learning parameters are identified, we shall first note that the learning related term Q . The initial shares identify the initial prior mean efficacy Q . 14 The effect of the number of past prescriptions and the amount of detailing and OME on market shares coupled with the evolution pattern of market shares identifies the variances of the detailing, OME and feedback signals.
The identification of the risk aversion parameter depends on differential rates of takeoff of the sequentially introduced brands. If physicians are risk neutral, we should not observe any difference between the rates at which prescriptions of different drugs take off. However, if physicians were risk averse, brands that are introduced later should see slower takeoff than earlier introductions. That is because, at the time of introduction of a brand, the variance of the belief about the new drug is much higher than that for an established drug. Thus, risk averse physicians would prescribe the drug at a slower rate initially than if they were risk neutral. The rate at which the prescriptions for this brand grows would be different from that for the first brand to be introduced in the market since the uncertainty about the mean efficacy of that drug 13 Time trend and stock of past prescriptions are very highly correlated (correlation ranging between 97% and 98%). We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this proxy. 14 An implicit identification restriction that we have imposed is that the efficacy weight is set to 1. An alternative and equivalent identification restriction is to fix one of the efficacy terms to one -this would allow us to estimate the efficacy weight. would be much lower by the time the subsequent drugs are introduced. This difference is what helps us identify the risk aversion parameter in our specification using aggregate data.
However, we find that the empirical identification of the initial prior variance is difficult with our data as the key identifying factor for this parameter -the degree of volatility in purchase decision initially -is only observed at the disaggregate level and not with aggregate data. Hence, we fix the initial prior variance to 1. Using disaggregate data (cf. Erdem and Keane 1996) , identifying both these parameters is possible as the purchase patterns of a single individual are observed. Thus, the volatility in the purchase decision in initial stages of a new brand helps identify the initial prior variance. When data are aggregated, this volatility is smoothed out across individuals. Hence, it is not observed in aggregate data.
The indirect and direct effects of detailing are separately identified out of the fact that in the later stages of the product life cycle, the indirect effect of advertising is very small in magnitude so any residual effect of detailing on prescription patterns comes out of the direct role. In contrast, in the early stages, both the indirect and the direct effects on prescription patterns exist. Thus, we are able to disentangle the magnitudes of these two effects of detailing. Another intuitive way of seeing how the two are identified separately is to note that the overall trend in shares identifies the indirect effect whereas the period-by-period variation in shares identifies the direct effect.
The time trend in the outside good utility is also identified as the learning process has a negligible effect in the later stages, while the time trend continues to have a role in later stages too. Finally, the substitution patterns that do not correspond to IIA behavior identify the distribution of heterogeneity (the elements of the variance-covariance matrix of the heterogeneity distribution ∑ ) for the linear parameters.
For added confirmation of the identification of the parameters in the model, we carried out simulations (available from the authors on request). We were able to recover the model parameters quite well.
Discussion of Model Specification
In this section, we compare our model specification to the models used in related research. The three studies that are closest to ours are Currie and Park (2002) , Ackerberg (2003) and Byzalov and Shachar (2003) . All these studies include direct and indirect effects of marketing communication. The indirect effect in Currie and Park (2002) and Ackerberg (2003) is introduced through an interaction between advertising and usage experience. Thus advertising reduces uncertainty about product quality only if the product is used. Byzalov and Shachar (2003) on the other hand model the indirect effect as reducing uncertainty about product quality even without usage experience. Thus, their specification is similar to ours. The direct effects in both Currie and Park (2002) and Byzalov and Shachar (2003) , on the other hand are like ours (though the latter study does not have a stock variable for advertising -only current advertising affects the utility).
None of the three studies cited above find evidence for direct effects of advertising while we find evidence for both direct and indirect effects. One significant difference in our study compared to Byzalov and Shachar (2002) is that we observe the category from inception and for a fairly long period of time. This, we believe, is a potential reason why we are able to identify both these effects, while this study does not. We also note that the nature of the indirect effect in our case is not the same as that in Ackerberg (2003) . While Ackerberg (2003) includes the effect of advertising through a signaling equilibrium, we allow marketing communication (detailing and OME) to inform the physician about drug efficacy. As Ackerberg (2003) notes (p. 1010), it is hard to empirically distinguish between these two effects and his choice of the signaling effect is essentially driven by the fact that television advertising for the category he studies (yogurt) is generally devoid of product information. In pharmaceutical categories, on the other hand, objective information about drug characteristics is an important component of both detailing calls and meetings/events. Hence, we believe that our specification is appropriate for the category we study.
Estimation
Our model is estimated using aggregate data. To do this, we develop a GMM-based method to estimate the model using such data. Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) (henceforth BLP) have developed a GMM based methodology that allows for the estimation of such random coefficient discrete choice models where prices may be endogenous. This is accomplished by transforming this non-linear problem into a linear problem as suggested in Berry (1994) . Then standard IV methods can be used for consistent estimation. This methodology is also described in detail in Nevo (2000) . However, in our setup, this methodology cannot be directly used. This is because we have the vector of serially correlated efficacy terms in the model, which are themselves functions of the parameters of the model. Therefore, we develop a modification of the standard BLP methodology to estimate our model. This is described in detail in an appendix that is available from the authors on request.
From a methodological point of view, we believe this is the first attempt to develop a GMM-based method to estimate learning models using aggregate data. This is an important contribution as in many product categories, especially ethical pharmaceutical drugs, individual level data of the kind used by Erdem and Keane (1996) , Anand and Shachar (2001) or Ackerberg (2003) is much harder to obtain due to legal and industry-specific factors. Thus, in contrast to models that use individual level data, there are significant differences both in the model itself and the estimation methodology. We now discuss some estimation issues.
To control for the possible endogeneity of prices, we use a methodology that allows for the use of instrumental variables. A valid instrument would be correlated with prices but uncorrelated with the unobserved product attribute. We use Purchaser Price Indices (PPIs) for bulk antihistamines as instruments in our study. PPIs constitute part of the costs of producing branded antihistamines and hence they are likely to be correlated with prices. However, they are likely to be uncorrelated with the unobserved product attribute. The PPI series data is publicly available at the Bureau of Labor Statistics. We use PPIs for upto 6 lagged periods and interact them with brand dummies to construct our instrument matrix. The exogenous variables are also included in this instrument matrix.
We specify heterogeneity only on the price coefficient. In principle one could specify a diagonal variance-covariance matrix for heterogeneity on all coefficients or even a full variance-covariance matrix.
However, with our dataset, this would lead to an unacceptably high dimensionality, as we have a total of 242 observations across brands and time. Hence, we restrict ourselves to this limited notion of heterogeneity.
Note that heterogeneity, per se, is not very important to our analysis as our primary interest is in the learning process and not in accounting for flexible substitution patterns.
As in the BLP approach, we need to integrate out the unobserved distribution of heterogeneity in the linear parameters across physicians. Additionally, we need to integrate out the distribution of efficacy across physicians. Since it would not be feasible to do these integrations analytically, we use the method of simulation for the purpose. For the purpose of simulation, we use 100 draws for the heterogeneity parameters and 100 set of stacked draws for the serially correlated efficacy-related signals. For each of these draws, the entire efficacy vector is computed. The predicted share is then obtained by a Monte Carlo integration of the individual probabilities for these 100 sets of draws.
Based on preliminary analyses, we found that the best carryover parameter for the stock variables was 70%. This is similar to the carryover parameters reported in previous studies (cf. Berndt et al. 1994) . This is also consistent with the industry belief that the effect of these expenditures lasts for about 6 months. A carryover of 70% implies that the effect of expenditure on a marketing activity is diminished by about 90% in 6 months. We also reparametrize the detailing and feedback signal variance parameters by exponentiating them in our estimation to ensure that they are positive. In our parameter estimates, we thus report the natural logarithms of the respective variances. In order to account for the outside good, we need an estimate of the potential market size. We assume the potential market to include the universe of allergy patients in the United States, estimated at 50 million (AAAAI 2001) . Finally, we use a Nelder-Mead Simplex method based minimizer to obtain our estimates and use numerical gradients to obtain the standard errors of our estimates.
Results

Parameter Estimates and Elasticities
We present the results of the empirical analysis in Table 3 . As can be seen from the table, the estimates are mostly significant and have the expected signs. Recall that the main parameters of interest are the variance of the detailing, OME and feedback signals and the linear parameters, i.e., the coefficients of price and goodwill stocks for DTC advertising, detailing and OME.
The first four parameters in Table 3 are the true mean efficacies for the three brands and the prior mean efficacy respectively. The parameter estimates indicate that the highest efficacy perception is for Claritin, followed by Allegra and Zyrtec. This is consistent with the context as Claritin is the oldest brand in the category and has the highest share. The mean efficacy levels for all three brands are higher than the prior mean efficacy. This implies that there is learning over time. Interestingly, our results show that Allegra has a higher true mean efficacy level than Zyrtec even though it was introduced later. This is consistent with the data -the share buildup for Allegra is faster than that for Zyrtec and by the end of the data series, Allegra has a higher share than Zyrtec.
The variance parameters for the detailing, OME and feedback signals are all significant and in the same order of magnitude. Note that these parameters are non-zero by construction and hence significance per se does not have any meaning but it suggests that the parameters are estimated tightly. The fact that the three variances are of similar orders of magnitudes suggests that these three sources of information contribute towards physician learning. If any of these variances were substantially different from the other, the signal with a much larger variance would play a smaller role in learning than compared to the other signals.
Recall that these signal variance parameters are relative to the initial prior variance, which is set to one. Hence their absolute values do not have any meaning. However, the ratio of the two effects is of interest as it informs us of the relative contribution to learning by these two information sources. Note also that in order to keep these parameters positive, we have reparametrized them as exponents. Hence, the parameter values in Table 3 have to be exponentiated before we take their ratios.
The ratio of the detailing, OME and feedback signal variances is 2.33:1.66:1 (at the point estimates).
This implies that a single feedback signal (which is obtained from one past prescription) is as informative as 2.33 detailing signals and 1.66 meeting signals. Recall that each dollar spent on detailing is one detailing signal. Hence, each feedback signal provides as much information 15 as $2.33 spent on detailing. A more useful comparison would be to see how much information a single detailing call provides relative to feedback from past prescriptions. For this, we need to convert the dollars spent on detailing into detailing calls. While there are no published estimates of the cost of detailing that we have come across, discussions with industry experts revealed that this cost varies between $60 and $100 per call. Thus, if we use the $60 figure, a single detailing call is then 60/2.33 = 25.79 times more informative than feedback from a past prescription.
Similarly, if we use the $100 figure for the cost of a detailing call, we can conclude that a single detailing call is 100/1.90 = 42.98 times more informative than feedback from a past prescription. 16 Another way to look at this comparison is to compute the marginal effects of these sources of information on prescriptions written. In Table 4 , we report the marginal effects of one extra prescription on the new prescriptions in the next month and that of an extra dollar of detailing and OME (considering only the learning effect of detailing and OME i.e., disregarding the effect through the linear goodwill term). As can be seen from the table, an extra prescription generates, on average, between 0.0029 and 0.0058 prescriptions in the subsequent month through the information that the feedback provides about the drug's efficacy. An extra dollar spent on detailing, on the other hand, generates an average of between 0.0007 and 0.0022 new prescriptions through its effect on learning about efficacy and an extra dollar spent on OME generates between 0.0014 and 0.0029 new prescriptions. These numbers may be potentially useful to pharmaceutical firms in terms of allocating dollar promotional expenditures across dollars spent on generating trial (e.g., through product samples) versus dollars spent on detailing.
The risk parameter (r) is not significantly different from zero, suggesting that physicians are riskneutral when prescribing drugs in this category. This is not a surprising result. First, the condition for which this drug is prescribed is not a life threatening one. It only affects the quality of life of the patient. Second, the side effects profile is relatively mild. The usual side effects like dry mouth, fatigue, drowsiness and dizziness can cause inconvenience and discomfort but do not lead to serious complications. Third, there are no serious interaction effects with other drugs that the patient may be simultaneously using. Since there are no serious consequences of prescribing drugs in this category (cf. VHA 1999), it is quite plausible that physicians are risk averse with respect to drug efficacy. Fourth, the risk may be borne by patients, not physicians.
We now discuss the linear parameters (Table 3 ). The price coefficient is negative and significant as expected. The coefficient for the time trend is positive and significant. As mentioned earlier, it is probably accounting for effects such as word-of-mouth. The coefficients for the goodwill stocks for detailing, DTC advertising and OME are all positive but only that for detailing is significant. This brings out an interesting distinction between the two main promotional activities directed at physicians. While there is an indirect effect of both detailing and OME, only detailing has a direct effect. If we consider the fact that detailing is a personal selling situation while OME includes activities like meetings and events where experts are invited to deliver talks to a group of physicians, this result is not surprising.
The coefficients for the season dummies are also positive and significant. The parameter on heterogeneity in price coefficient is, however, not significant. We conjecture that it is hard to identify heterogeneity in our dataset since there are only three brands and relatively few observations. As mentioned earlier, heterogeneity is identified in such models through the observed substitution patterns. With only three brands between which substitution can take place, the heterogeneity parameter becomes difficult to identify in the data. An alternative specification without the heterogeneity parameter did not affect the results substantially in terms of significance and direction.
The elasticities for detailing, DTC advertising and other marketing expenses are reported in tables 5 through 7. We computed the price elasticites and they are reasonable (the own price elasticities are -2.1815, -2.6072 and -2.2502 for Allegra, Claritin and Zyrtec respectively). While there are analytical expressions for elasticities of price and DTC advertising, the detailing and OME elasticities need to be computed by simulating changes in shares with small changes in the detailing or OME expenditure respectively in a particular month. This is because detailing and OME affect share in two ways -by affecting learning and directly through the linear effect on utility. The elasticity estimates indicate that demand is most elastic to detailing, followed by OME and DTC advertising in that order. The relative ordering of elasticities is in line with prior research (e.g., Neslin 2001 and Wittink 2002 report higher effect of detailing than of DTC advertising and OME in their studies across several pharmaceutical categories). In the anti-cholesterol category, Wosinska (2002) also finds that the marginal effect of detailing is higher than that of DTC advertising.
The main result of interest in this study is the distinction between the indirect and direct effects of detailing. We find that the coefficient for the linear detailing goodwill stock is positive and significant. We also find that detailing plays an important role in the learning process. This suggests that both indirect and direct effects of detailing are present in this category. We compute the partial indirect and direct effects of detailing. We do this by varying only the number of detailing signals or only the detailing stock respectively while keeping the other fixed in our elasticity computations. It may be noted that the total elasticity of detailing is then just the sum of these partial elasticities.
Our finding that there are both indirect and direct effects of detailing contrasts with the finding in Currie and Park (2002) . They find that while detailing has an indirect effect, the direct effect is not significant. 17 Their results would suggest that firms should stop spending money on detailing after the introductory phase of a drug's life cycle. This is because once physicians are well informed about the efficacy of a drug, the indirect role of detailing would not have any effect on their prescription decision. Yet we observe that firms continue to spend large sums of money on detailing several years after introduction of a drug. Our results are consistent with this observation since we find that the direct effect of detailing is significant. Hence, even after the introductory stage of a drug's life cycle, firms have incentives to continue detailing.
The indirect and direct elasticities of detailing as well as the total effect are reported in Table 5 .
These numbers seem to suggest that, on average, the direct effect is much higher than the indirect effect.
However, these averages do not account for the fact that the indirect effect decreases over time, as the physician's belief about the mean efficacy asymptotes to the true mean efficacy of the drug. The direct effect does not have this feature and varies only with the levels of detailing and the shares, thus staying within a relatively narrow band. Figure 1 shows plots of indirect and direct partial elasticities of detailing over time for the three brands. These plots suggest that the indirect effect becomes negligible by the end of the data series. It takes between nine and fifteen months for this effect to fall below 10% of its peak level. In other words, the learning effect due to detailing is above 10% of its peak value for the first 9 months to a just over a year, depending on the brand. Across brands, the drop to 10% of peak values is fastest for Zyrtec (nine months) while it takes fifteen months for the other two brands. Thus, most of the learning from detailing occurs in this introductory phase of the brand's life cycle.
As mentioned earlier, we conjecture that the indirect effect of detailing dominates in the introductory period for the brand, but that the direct effect dominates later on. In order to check this, we plot the indirect and direct effects as proportions of total elasticities of detailing for the three brands (Figure 2 ). The plots suggest that the indirect effects dominate for the first few months after introduction of the brand and in subsequent months, the direct effects dominate. The indirect effects dominate for 13 months after introduction for Allegra, 14 months after introduction for Claritin and 6 months after introduction for Zyrtec. These brand-level differences on how long the indirect effects dominate are related to the patterns of detailing of these brands. In the first six months after introduction, the detailing for Zyrtec was 152% of the average for the entire data. For Claritin, detailing in the first six months was at 116% of the overall average, and for Allegra, it was at 70% of the overall average. Hence, this initial burst of detailing for Zyrtec causes much faster learning through detailing. As a result, the indirect effect asymptotes towards zero much more rapidly in the case of Zyrtec than for the other two brands.
In sum, our results highlight an important aspect of the effect of marketing communication that has not been explicitly studied in prior research. We find evidence in support of our postulate that indirect effects dominate in the initial phase of the brand's life cycle and direct effects dominate later on. Previous studies have often looked at mature product categories and have therefore been unable to use data from the introduction of the category. Further, they do not explicitly account for both indirect and direct effects simultaneously occurring in new product categories. Thus, our finding about the dominance of the indirect and direct effects in different stages of the product life cycle is an important contribution to the literature on the effects of marketing communication.
Managerial Implications
From a managerial perspective, an important issue is the long-run effect of detailing and the consequent implications on allocation of detailing dollars over the life cycle of the drug. The long-run effect of detailing on physician prescriptions arises from three sources. First, higher levels of detailing cause faster learning about drug efficacy. This causes more prescriptions to be written in future periods. We shall refer to this as the primary indirect effect of detailing. Second, higher levels of detailing also affect future goodwill stock of detailing, again causing an increase in the number of prescriptions written. We shall refer to this as the primary direct effect of detailing. Finally, there is also an indirect effect of detailing that arises from the number of prescriptions written. As the number of prescriptions written (both in the current and future periods) increases, the resulting increase in feedback signals causes a further increase in the rate of learning. We shall refer to this effect as the secondary indirect effect. Note that the secondary indirect effects only come into play when we consider long-run effects since feedback signals only affect learning for subsequent periods.
We compute long-run elasticities of detailing on physician prescriptions, taking into account these three effects. We report the average monthly long-run elasticities of detailing in Table 8 , computed by first evaluating elasticities for the current and eleven subsequent months and then converting these into monthly averages. These long-run elasticities are substantially higher than short-run elasticities, indicating that detailing effects persist over a reasonable period of time. We then decompose these long-run elasticities into the three component effects -the primary indirect effect, the primary direct effect and the secondary indirect effect. We compute the changes in prescriptions for the current and eleven subsequent months for each of these components by varying only the respective component and simulating the new prescriptions. The percentage contributions of these partial elasticities to the total elasticities are reported in Table 9 .
An inspection of the table shows that the relative strength of the three effects varies across the brands. The primary direct effect dominates for Claritin and Zyrtec, while the primary indirect effect dominates for Allegra. These differences arise because the brands are introduced at different points of time and have different share and detailing patterns over time. For instance, Allegra, the last brand to be introduced, has much greater indirect effects at the end of the data series than Claritin, whose indirect effects have reduced to negligible levels. This is reflected in the higher average contribution of indirect effects (primary as well as secondary) for Allegra than for Claritin. The secondary indirect effects are relatively small for the three brands.
As in the case of short-run elasticities, we expect to see differences in long-run effects depending on whether the brand is in the introductory stage of its life-cycle or in later stages. In the introductory stages, where physicians are not well informed about the brand's efficacy, the indirect effects will have a greater contribution to total effects than the direct effects and this will be true in the long-run as well. As shown earlier, the short-run indirect elasticities dominate for nine to eighteen months after introduction. We therefore compute the average contributions for the first nine months after introduction for each brand.
These numbers are reported in Table 10 . As expected, the primary indirect effects dominate in this introductory phase. In Table 11 , we report the contributions due to the three effects in the last nine months of the data series. In this period, the contributions of direct effects are much higher than in the introductory phase.
Our findings on the variation of the detailing elasticities over time suggest that that it may be beneficial for firms to allocate more resources to detailing in the early introductory phase, when both indirect and direct effects are present, than in later periods, when only the direct effects are present. In other words, firms are better off if they spend more on detailing in the introductory period, as it leads to faster learning. However, they need still need to detail in later periods as direct effects affect prescriptions as well.
We therefore examine the actual detailing patterns for the three brands over time. Starting from the month of introduction, we compute the total detailing expenditure for three blocks of twenty months each.
Recall that the first block is approximately the period when indirect effects dominate. In the second block, the direct effects are larger than the indirect effects. In the final block, the indirect effects are almost negligible. The total dollar expenditure for the three brands in three periods is Allegra ($73.7 million, $129.3 million, $148.4 million), Claritin ($99.4 million, $88.9 million,$103.8 million) and Zyrtec ($123.6 million, $85.6 million, $96.2 million). Interestingly, only Zyrtec shows a pattern similar to our expectation (high detailing in the introductory period followed by lower detailing). Allegra has low detailing in the introductory block of months relative to later periods while Claritin exhibits (approximately) constant detailing expenditure over the three blocks. Even in terms of detailing to sales ratios, the three brands Allegra (53%, 28% and 18%), Claritin (37%, 13% and 8%) and Zyrtec (72%, 25%, 18%) exhibit differences in their temporal patterns of detailing (although these ratios are reducing over time for all brands). However, it is important to note that our results would predict a reduction in absolute levels of detailing over time since the detailing elasticity reduces over time. As Allegra and Claritin detailing does not follow the pattern suggested by our results, we conduct counterfactual "experiments" to assess the revenue impact if they had followed the suggested pattern.
Specifically, we investigate how revenues for the first sixty months after introduction would change for Claritin and Allegra if their detailing expenditure was high initially and lower in subsequent months. We reallocate the actual total Allegra and Claritin detailing expenditure across the three time blocks (of 20 months each) in the same proportion as the actual Zyrtec allocation across these blocks. We vary the detailing of one brand at a time and compute the new predicted shares, keeping everything else (including other brands' detailing expenditure) fixed at actual levels. Since OME also contributes to learning, differences in OME levels across brands could confound the results. Hence we keep the OME level fixed across brands while conducting this experiment and set it to zero without loss of generality. Our results indicate that, relative to actual total revenues, Allegra's total revenues in the first sixty months would go up by 14.04% while those of Claritin go up by 4.48. This is in line with our expectation since Allegra's detailing pattern is more different from Zyrtec's detailing pattern than Claritin's. These results indicate that, all else being equal, firms can increase their revenues by optimizing the temporal allocation of their detailing expenditure.
Model Comparison
We compare our model (M0) to four alternative models in order to assess its fit and predictive performance.
The first alternative model (M1) that we estimate is identical to our model except that there are indirect (via detailing, OME and past prescriptions) but no direct effects. The second alternative model (M2) that we estimate is identical to our model except that there are direct (via detailing, OME and DTC) but no indirect effects. We also estimate a model (M3) that is the same as M2 except that we include cumulative past prescriptions to account for some persistence effects and drop the time trend (as it is highly correlated with the cumulative past prescriptions). Finally, using a Kalman filter like approach, we estimate a reduced form version of our model in which we allow the intercepts to vary over time (M4). We use the first 102 out of the 105 months in our dataset, keeping the last three months as holdout. We compute the mean absolute percent deviation (MAPD) both for the data in sample and for the holdout sample. As can be seen from Table 12 , the in-sample MAPD for our model is lower than the MAPD from the alternative models. Similarly, the out-ofsample MAPD is also lower than the MAPD from the alternative models. This implies that our structural approach captures the data generating process better than the alternative models (some of which are reducedform models).
Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a structural model that allows us to describe the role of marketing communication in influencing the evolution of preferences in new product categories. We use a modeling approach that allows us to distinguish and examine the evolution of the indirect and the direct roles of marketing communication from the category's inception. Using a unique dataset that contains observations from the introduction of the category, we find evidence for both indirect and direct effects of detailing. This finding is significant because most prior research has found primarily one effect, but without consensus between studies on which one that was. It is possible that studies that found primarily direct effects did so because they used data for mature brands in their empirical analysis. It is natural to expect that indirect effects would be much smaller for mature brands than for new brands.
We also find that the indirect role dominates in the early stages while the direct stage dominates in the later stages. The direct effect becomes higher thirteen, fourteen and six months post-introduction for the three brands that we study. In terms of resource allocation for detailing over time, these results suggest that firms should follow a pattern of heavier detailing at the introduction phase followed by lower levels.
Another contribution of this paper is that it bridges the gap that exists in the literature between models for new product categories that are non-structural with respect to the process of diffusion and models that are structural but do not study new product categories. Finally, from a methodological viewpoint, we propose and estimate a learning model for aggregate data using a GMM based method that does not require parametric assumptions on the unobserved attribute and allows for endogeneity of prices. 18 Based on our results, we are able to estimate significant and as well as substantial learning effects due to product experience and promotional activities. We find that a single detailing call is between 26 and 43 times as informative as a single feedback from a patient in terms of learning about the efficacy of drugs. This would in part explain why pharmaceutical firms spend such large amounts of money on detailing. It also suggests that detailing has important positive welfare effects, as doctors learn about efficacy of drugs faster if they are exposed to detailing.
Our study reinforces findings in prior research that the detailing elasticities are much higher than elasticities of other marketing activities like DTC advertising and meetings. Thus, the results suggest that the most effective means of marketing communication in pharmaceutical categories is detailing. However, this does not explain the fact that many new brands, particularly in the recent past, have high spends on DTC advertising, often comparable to the expenditure on detailing for those brands. This suggests that there is further work required to understand the role of these marketing instruments. For example, the two instruments could operate in conjunction. In addition, perhaps DTC advertising and detailing play differential roles with respect to category expansion and brand switching. These questions deserve further investigation.
Our model has some limitations. First, the aggregate nature of our data imposes a series of assumptions on physician behavior and the learning process. In particular, it does not allow physicians to be forward-looking and it forces us to ignore the presence of intermediaries like insurance firms and health maintenance organizations (HMOs) that may play an important role the physician's choice. However, note that high-quality panel data with prescriptions and competitive marketing activity is still hard to obtain for pharmaceutical categories. Second, our model (as is the case with models in its class), does not allow for forgetting about efficacy to take place. We do not expect to find forgetting in our data as ethical drugs are a high-involvement product category. In addition, in our chosen category, there are only three brands that are regularly prescribed in very large numbers. However, this may be of importance particularly in nonpharmaceutical categories with a large number of choice alternatives. In other words, consumers may forget about brands if they are not regularly exposed to marketing communication (Mehta et al. 2004 ). Third, the aggregate nature of our data is somewhat restrictive as it does not allow us to identify potential parameters of interest such as unique prior efficacy belief for each brand, the risk aversion on the part of the patients and the correlations in the signal errors. We hope to address these limitations in future research. The authors find evidence for the indirect effect of advertising but do not find evidence for the direct effect in this product category. 1 For each month, the percentage change in NRXs for the current period and 11 subsequent months due to each percentage change in current detailing expenditure was evaluated. This annual figure was then converted into a monthly average. This average is reported in order to make it comparable to short-run elasticity estimates reported earlier, which are for the current month only. Note: As the three brands were introduced at different times, they are at different stages in their brand life-cycles in the last six months of the data series. Specifically, Claritin was introduced the earliest and by the end of the data series, its informative effect has reduced by a much greater extent than for the other brands. Model M0 -Proposed model with both informative and direct effects; Model M1 -Identical to proposed model M0 but with no direct effects of detailing, OME and past prescriptions; Model M2 -Identical to proposed model M0 but with no informative effects of detailing, OME and past prescriptions; Model M3 -Identical to model M2 but with a stock of past prescriptions instead of time trend; Model M4 -Kalman Filter Model -evolving intercepts but identical linear specification as model M2 
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